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2.1. Introduction 
What is the (approximate) total cost of building, maintaining and operating a new high speed 
rail (HSR) line? Trying to answer this question is the main objective of this paper. To address 
it we will make an extensive use of the companion Chapter 4, where a database containing 
information about 166 actual HSR projects in 20 countries is analysed in detail. This database 
provides a rough guide about the typical cost structure of any HSR project and suggests 
tentative estimates for some representative unit values of those costs. This information, 
together with some additional values gathered from other sources (Levinson et al. 1997; 
ATKINS 2003; SDG 2004, De Rus and Nombela 2007), allow us to perform a simple 
simulation exercise capable not only of providing an answer to the initial question, but also of 
offering insights on the relevance of some elements in determining the total costs of a HSR 
line. 
The cost structure of a HSR project can be mainly divided into costs associated to the 
infrastructure and costs associated to the rolling stock. Infrastructure costs include 
investments in construction and maintenance of the guideways (tracks) including the sidings 
along the line, terminals and stations at the ends of the line and along the line, respectively, 
energy supplying and line signalling systems, train controlling and traffic management 
systems and equipment, etc. Construction costs are incurred prior to starting commercial 
operations (except in the case of line extensions or upgrades of the existing network). 
Maintenance costs include those related to the overhauling of infrastructure, including labour 
costs, materials, spare parts, etc. It occurs periodically, according to planned schedules 
calculated according to the assets depreciation. In general, infrastructure costs can be 
considered as fixed, since they mostly depend on the size of the infrastructure (line length, 
number of stations, etc.) instead of on traffic figures. 
Rolling stock costs include three main subcategories: acquisition, operation and maintenance. 
With regard to the first one, the price of a HSR trainset is determined by its technical 
specifications, one of whose main factors is the capacity (number of seats). However, there 
are other factors that can affect the final price, such as the contractual relationship between 
the manufacturer and the rail operator,1
                                                 
1 Some rail operators have internal departments for designing their rolling stock; others prefer contracting out. 
 the delivery and payment conditions, the specific 
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internal configuration demanded by the operator, etc. With respect to the operating costs, 
these mainly include the costs of the labour (personnel) and energy consumed for the running 
of the trains; the costs of the insurance, train formation (if it is necessary), in-train passenger 
services (food, drinks, etc). These costs usually depend on the number of trains (fleet) 
operated on a particular line, which in turn, is indirectly determined by the demand. Since the 
technical requirements (for example, crew members) of the trains may differ with their size, 
sometimes it is preferable to estimate these costs as dependent of the number of seats or seats-
km. In the case of the cost of maintaining rolling stock (including again labour, materials and 
spare parts), they are also indirectly affected by the demand (through the fleet size), but 
mainly by the train usage, which can be approximated by the total distance covered every year 
by each train. 
There are other costs involved in the building and operation of a HSR project. For example, 
planning costs are associated to the technical and economic feasibility studies carried out 
before construction. These (fixed) costs, as well as those associated to the legal preparation of 
the land (expropriation or acquisition to current landowners), can be somehow included in the 
construction cost category. On the hand, there are some operating costs (general 
administration, marketing, internal training, etc.) that are fixed and cannot be easily assigned 
either to infrastructure or operations. In most projects these costs represent only a minimal 
fraction of the operating costs and, therefore, can be globally treated. Finally, it is important to 
mention here that we will not address the issue of external costs to answer the initial question 
posed in this paper. The reason is that, even in the case that could reach accurate estimates of 
these costs, the distribution of their burden over the agents involved in a HSR project is not 
always clear. This is not the case of the infrastructure and rolling stock costs, which can be 
both safely attributed to the HSR project.   
 Although the cost structure of most HSR projects corresponds to the one we have just 
described, it is also true that the exact values of each cost vary largely across projects in 
accordance to their specific characteristics. For that reason, this paper proposes a general 
approach, based on a simulation exercise in which, departing from several justifiable 
parameter values (reference case), we calculate the (net present value) of the total costs of a 
HSR line (disaggregated into the described infrastructure and rolling stock costs categories). 
Then, by changing the values of the initial parameters, ceteris paribus, we can perform 
comparative statics, which provide us with useful insights on the overall validity of our 
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exercise. The information found in the database in Chapter 4 related to the unit costs of HSR 
projects is the cornerstone of the model. 
The use of simulation techniques in applied economics has been often criticized as 
excessively naïve. Although we acknowledge this criticism, the simulation exercise 
performed in this paper will always try to remain as close as possible to reality, minimizing 
the number of simplifying assumptions while simultaneously keeping the numbers 
manageable. At the same time, the information provided in Chapter 4 will be treated with 
caution, taking into account the observed differences across projects and countries. Whenever 
possible, we will distinguish between best, medium and worst alternative scenarios and, when 
in doubt, we will opt for the most cost-favourable option, so that our final estimates can be 
seen in each case as a lower bound to the actual cost of HSR.  
Other papers on HSR make use of simulation techniques, either to make estimates about their 
social profitability (see chapter 3, for example) or to study counterfactuals that are not 
currently happening but could happen in a near future (as in chapter 4, or Ivaldi and Vibes 
2005, to study intermodal competition). They all share a basic economic model with 
simplifying assumptions where data from different sources is plugged into in order to get the 
simulation results.  
After this introduction, the structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the most 
relevant features of the project (building and operating for 40 years a single HSR line 
connecting two cities without intermediate stops) and its most significant operating 
characteristics. Section 2.3 describes demand projections and how supply is calculated 
accordingly. In Section 2.4 the infrastructure and rolling stock costs are simulated under 
several assumptions on demand, train capacity, speed and line length, simultaneously 
considering three alternative scenarios (best, medium, and worst) for the estimates of the unit 
costs. Finally, Section 2.5 is devoted to a complete discussion of the results and their 
implications. 
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2.2. Project characteristics 
2.2.1. Overview and timeline 
Consider that a new high speed line is going to be built to connect two similar-sized cities, 
City O (origin) and City D (destination), separated by a distance of 500 kilometres. Most of 
the infrastructure and rolling stock used in this project will be completely new (it is not an 
upgrade of an existing conventional line), although the existing train terminals in both cities 
will require only minor refurbishment. 
The time needed for planning and technical design of a HSR line varies largely across 
projects, depending on their specific legal and administrative arrangements. In some projects, 
with favourable legislation, efficient contracting procedures and adequate political pressure, 
can take less than one year, whereas in other cases —particularly, when legal conflicts arise 
on land occupation or there are other issues of public concern —the planning period may be 
delayed up to 20 years (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004). 
Once the required technical and economic studies have been carried out, the actual 
deployment of the infrastructure and other sideworks is mainly conditioned by the 
characteristics of the terrain. In our simulation exercise, we will make the simplifying 
assumption that most of the area covered by the line is countryside flat, with only a few 
difficult segments (either mountain or density and continuously urbanised areas) which may 
require viaducts and/or tunnels.2 For that reason, and assuming that the planning and design 
stage is done with the maximum celerity, we will consider that total construction period 
(denoted as Tc) will be 5 years.3
                                                 
2 Note, as mentioned at Section 2.1, that this is a cost-reducing assumption that favours the project. A more 
difficult orography would imply a longer construction and planning period and, subsequently, higher costs. 
 Once built, the line starts commercial operations immediately 
and operates during 35 consecutive years, so that the project total duration is T = 40 years 
(from t = 0 to T), as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
3 We will also consider that, on average, the same number of kilometres is built every year. In practice, however, 
projects evolve at different speeds, depending on the technical limitations, the delivery of materials and the 
official termination dates of each stage. 
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Figure 2.1. Project timeline: construction and operation period 
 
 
Setting T = 40 is a decision that responds to the estimated evolution of the HSR technology. 
While a shorter period would seem rather uneconomical (most of the infrastructure costs 
would be hardly recovered), a much longer period would be unrealistic, since the HSR 
technology is advancing so fast that in a few decades it is quite likely that the current 
equipment will be obsolete. In the real world, only a few Japanese Shinkansen lines (started in 
1964) have enjoyed such a large lifespan so far, but during this period they have been largely 
improved at least twice (Hood 2006). 
Finally, note that the construction (and planning) period involves much more than track 
building. It requires the design and building of depots, maintenance and other sites, as well as 
hiring and training of personnel, testing of the material and many other preparation issues. In 
our project, we will assume that all these tasks are adequately performed in time, that no 
major delays occur and that the line is ready for commercial use at Tc. 
2.2.2. Operational characteristics  
There are two closely related operational characteristics of the line – the average speed of the 
trains running over it and the total distance covered by them – that are very relevant from the 
point of view of construction and operation, and thus deserve a closer look. In addition, the 
ratio between line length and speed determines the travel time, which is a key factor in 
attracting demand. 
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 SPEED 
Obviously, speed is a crucial piece in the characterization of a high speed line. However, the 
technical definition of speed is not unique,4
A second concept is the maximum operating speed, which is related to the technical 
characteristics of the trains and the way in which these are operated. This operating speed 
evolves with the technology and generally increases over time, only constrained by the 
maximum track speed. For example, in its early stages, the Shinkansen system’s main line 
was hardly capable of speeds of up to 220 km per hour. But in its latest specifications, these 
bullet trains have earned their name by reaching speeds close to 600 km per hour (Hood 
2006). Today, most European HSR services operate with trains capable of maximum speeds 
in the range of 280-300 km per hour.
 since there are several related terms whose 
economic implications have to be separately considered. First of all is the maximum track 
speed, a technical parameter mainly related to infrastructure that, in the design stage, 
determines the radius of the curves and the gradient of the slopes. The ability of a train to 
trace closed curves without derailments or climb steep mountains or hills is inversely related 
to its speed. For that reason, a HSR line faces tougher construction restrictions and may 
require a longer length the higher the maximum track speed of the project. 
5
Under normal operating conditions, and depending on the incidence of delays and the 
characteristics of the terrain, HSR services are usually provided at average operating speeds 
of 20-25 km per hour below their maximum operating speed, which is the optimal technical 
speed in relation to which the useful life of the rolling stock is calculated and the 
recommended maintenance plans are designed by the manufacturers. 
  
The final (and most widely used) speed concept is the (average) commercial speed, which is 
simply calculated by dividing the total travel time over the line length. It can be noted that this 
is not only a technical concept (determined by the operating and track speeds), but an 
economic one as well: travel time is affected by technical considerations, but also by other 
(non-technical) elements, such as the commercial schedule, the number of intermediate stops, 
                                                 
4 In Chapter 2 we argue that speed is not just a technical concept, but also an economic one, since it is related to 
the infrastructure exploitation model chosen by the rail operator. 
5 In Europe new maximum speed tests have been recently (2007) announced by the TGV in France 
(www.sncf.com/news) and for the Paris-London route. Furthermore, we do not include here the (much faster) 
magnetic levitation technology (MAGLEV), since its commercial use is still very limited. 
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the quality assured to customers,6 etc. In our simulation exercise we will use a commercial 
speed (s) of 250 km per hour and consider that it will not change during the operating lifespan 
of the project.7
 LENGTH 
 
HSR projects are very diverse across the world and their lengths vary accordingly. Most 
countries start with single point-to-point lines that are later expanded by adding new corridors 
or by connecting the existing ones to larger networks. A typical example is the Madrid-Seville 
AVE (471 km), which – apart from smaller legs (such as La Sagra-Toledo, 22 km) – has been 
recently expanded with the Madrid-Lleida (481 km) line and other upcoming ones also 
departing from Madrid (De Rus and Román 2005). The same centralized structure 
corresponds to the French TGV, which started with the Paris-Lyon line (417 km) that was 
later continued (Paris-Marseille, 750 km) and connected to the high speed network (TGV 
North, TGV Atlantic, etc.). 
From the point of view of our simulation exercise we have chosen a standard distance of 500 
km between cities O and D by taking into account that with a commercial speed of 250 km 
per hour travel time would be approximately of 2 hours. This is compatible with the results in 
chapter 4 regarding the intermodal competitiveness of HSR services. They find that rail 
market share quickly decreases when travel time is below 1 hour (when road transport is 
much more attractive for passengers) and over 3 hours (since this would imply a distance that 
could be covered faster travelling by plane). In any case, since the length of the HSR line is a 
key variable that determines to a great extent the infrastructure costs, we will test alternative 
length assumptions in our simulation exercise. 
 
                                                 
6 For example, when there are punctuality commitments. In the Madrid-Seville line, in Spain, commercial speed 
is around 210 km per hour, but it can be increased on certain services to reduce delays. 
7 This final assumption is discussable (since technology improvements are likely), but it is related to the 
simplifying assumption (see below) that the fleet is homogeneous and technology does not change until T=40. 
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2.3. Demand and supply 
2.3.1. Demand estimation and distribution 
From a microeconomic point of view, individual travel demand within the O-D corridor is an 
endogenous variable that depends on the relative generalised cost faced by the passengers on 
each alternative transport mode. From a broader perspective, aggregate demand depends on 
macroeconomic (such as the population density, the distribution of personal income), or 
cultural factors (traditions and history associated to rail travel) related to that corridor. For 
those reasons, and assuming that the relevance of intermodal competition in our corridor is 
minimal, annual traffic estimates can be simply calculated by projecting a reasonable initial 
figure along the operating period of the project. 
Chapter 4 show that the initial demand figures are quite different across countries. They are 
usually large in Japan and Korea (where the high speed lines inaugurated in 2004 gained more 
than 40 million passengers in two years) and exhibit a more timid start in Europe (between 
1.5 and 5 million passengers in the first year, depending on the line). In general, chapter 3 
prove that the lowest initial demand value for 500-km HSR to be socially profitable is around 
6-7 passenger-trips. For simulation purposes we have chosen the slightly more conservative 
figure of 5 million passengers per year (Q5, that is, starting at t=5), and consider that only in 
very densely populated corridors larger figures (10, 20 million) would make sense. 
A final but relevant simplifying assumption related to the demand is the fact that we consider 
that it is completely symmetrically distributed in three dimensions: between cities O and D, 
along the day (no peak-off peak periods within the day), and along the year (no peak seasons 
within the year).8
With respect to the annual growth rates, reflecting the ‘maturity effect’ also detected at 
Chapter4, we can consider that there is a expansion period (say, the first 5 years of operation) 
where the initial demand grows at a larger rate (g1 = 5% from t = 6 to 11), while growing at a 
lower rate (g2=3%) afterwards. 
 
                                                 
8 Again, these are cost-reducing assumptions, since the existence of demand asymmetries would increase the 
capacity needed on peaks periods, which would not be used in off-peak ones.  
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Table 2.1. Traffic projections with alternative initial demand assumptions 
Annual demand initial 
assumption 
One-way traffic estimate (passengers per day) 
Initial year 
(t = 5) 
After 20 years 
(t = 25) 
After 35 years 
(t = 40) 
Q5 = 2,500,000 pass. 3,425 6,942 10,815 
Q5 = 5,000,000 pass. 6,849 13,884 21,630 
Q5 = 10,000,000 pass. 13,699 27,767 43,261 
Q5 = 20,000,000 pass. 27,397 55,535 86,521 
 
With all these values, and departing from four alternative initial annual demand estimates 
(2.5, 5, 10 and 20 million, respectively), Table 2.1 shows the resulting one-way traffic 
projections (in terms of passengers per day) at three different points: the start of the operating 
period, 20 years later and, at the end of the project lifetime.9
These differences would be even worse if, alternatively, the projections were made ignoring 
the “maturity effect”, that is, under the assumption that the demand grows at the same rate 
from t =5 to t =40 (that is, g1 = g2= 5%). Figure 2.2 shows the corresponding (faster-growing) 
projections, where the final daily demands at t=40 would range from 18,890 (starting with 2.5 
million passengers per year) to 151,124 (starting with 20 million). Since these figures seem 
less realistic, our simulation exercise will be based on the projections depicted in Table 2.1. 
 The variability is large; for 
example, if the initial demand is 2.5 million passengers per year, at t = 40 it would imply a 
daily (one-way) traffic of 10,815 passengers; for 20 million, the corresponding value would 
be eight times larger (86,521). 
                                                 
9 Daily traffic estimates are simply calculated by dividing annual demand between 365 days and between 2, 
since the O-D traffic is symmetric. 
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Figure 2.2. One-way traffic projections (under faster growth assumption) 
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Note: Vertical axis measures the number of passengers per day. Demand grows at 5% (t = 6-40). 
 
2.3.2. Defining supply: train capacity and frequency 
If demand is measured as the daily number of (one-way) passengers, the corresponding 
definition of supply is the number of seats offered everyday from O to D (or vice versa). 
Then, train capacity and frequency become the key factors that determine the supply of HSR 
services in our O-D corridor. 
 TRAIN CAPACITY 
The capacity (number of seats) of a train designed for HSR services depends on the technical 
specifications envisaged by the manufacturer and the specific internal configuration agreed 
with the prospective buyer. Nowadays, most train models can be easily adapted to project-
specific needs (legal requirements, cultural differences, passenger density, intensity of use, 
etc.) and their costs vary accordingly. In general three size groups can be identified in the 
existing manufacturers catalogues: low-capacity trains (between 200-250 seats), medium- 
capacity trains (between 300-400 seats) and high capacity trains (more than 500 seats). The 
first group includes, for example, the ALARIS and TALGO units in Spain; the second group 
includes, most models of the French TGV (including the THALYS), the Spanish AVE and 
some German ICE trains, whereas in the final group would be the TGV duplex and most of 
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the Japanese units. For our simulation exercise we have assumed an average value of q = 330 
seats. 
As mentioned above, a relevant simplifying assumption made here is that we shall consider 
that all the trains in the fleet are exactly equal and that they all operate in single composition. 
We acknowledge that is one of our less realistic assumptions, since in the real world, when 
demand grows over time the operator may respond by incorporating higher-capacity trains or 
by operating the existing ones in double composition, thus duplicating its supply. Despite it 
weakness, the assumption is necessary to keep simple the supply calculations.10
 FREQUENCY 
 
There are several alternative methods to calculate the number of seats (and, given their 
capacity, the number of trains) that the operator should provide to service the daily demand. 
Our calculations about the number of daily services and their frequency (defined as the 
number of services per hour) will be based on an average load factor of 75% (l), which gives 
us the basic relationship between supply and demand that will be maintained through the 
exercise. 
In the real world, most existing HSR services are characterized by relatively high load factors 
(well above 70%), or at least larger than other equivalent rail services. This is explained by 
the fact that HSR lines are specifically designed for passenger traffic in dense traffic 
corridors, with minimal intermediate stops and a marketing focus, centred on the travel time 
and price. In our particular example – a direct service between O-D with a very regular and 
symmetric demand – the load factor must be large by definition. However, note that a load 
factor close to 100%, for example, is impractical because it would imply that all trains would 
be always fully booked and some travellers could not use them. 
Apart from our assumption of l =75%, a few other values are needed. In particular, we will 
use the average commercial speed of s = 250 km per hour (which yields a travel time of 2 
hours per direction), and the train average capacity of q = 330 seats (which implies that the 
effective occupation is eq = 0.75 · 330 = 248 seats). In addition we consider that there is a 
                                                 
10 It is unclear the net effect on costs associated to dropping this assumption. On one hand, with higher-capacity 
trains, the total number of trains needed is reduced; but, on the other hand, their operating and maintenance costs 
could be larger, particularly if they are more intensively used.  
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boarding and train preparation time before each service of 15 minutes (0.25 hours) and that 
trains operate 18 hours a day (from 06:00 to 24:00).11
Using these values and departing from our projections of the (one-way) daily demand 
(denoted by qt), the total number of daily services per direction is obtained from the ratio 
 
/t eq q . The frequency (F) is then given by: 
 ( / )
18
t e
t
q qF = , 
in terms of number of services per hour. For example, for the reference case, if q5= 6,849 
passengers, F5= 1.54 services per hour, which in turn implies a service every 39 minutes.12
Since the demand is symmetric and total travel time of a return trip (including boarding times) 
is 4h 30’ (τ =4.5 hours), the (minimum) number of trains (of capacity 
 
q , at speed s, and with 
a load factor of 75%) needed daily in the O-D corridor would be given by the ratio 
1/ tF
τ , that 
is 
 
18
t
e
q
q
τ . 
In order to face unforeseeable contingencies (delays, external damages, breakdowns, etc.) this 
minimum number is multiplied by a (exogenous) ‘contingency factor’, which we will set in 
1.5.13
 
 Thus, the supply (in terms of the number of trains) would be finally given by: 
(1.5)
18
t
t
e
qRS
q
= ⋅τ , 
where RSt stands for ‘rolling stock needed at t’.  
Figure 2.3 illustrates the supply calculations results and their evolution under alternative train 
capacity assumptions. Note, for example for the reference case (with q = 330 seats) that our 
                                                 
11 A summary of all the parameter values for the reference case are provided, as a quick reference, in Table 2.2, 
below. 
12 This is a low value when compared to the real world. It corresponds to an initial demand of 5,000,000 
passengers per year. In subsequent years, when the demand grows, the frequency (Ft) would also increase, 
reaching more reasonable values of one service every 15 or less minutes.   
13 This factor is quite firm-specific and it is associated to the risk of failing to provide services vs. the cost of 
acquiring, operating and maintaining an over-sized fleet. The range of values found in the real world varies from 
1.25 to 1.6, depending on the corridor.  
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HSR service would start its operations with 11 trains, but in t=40 the figure would be 33, due 
to the increase in the projected demand. With q = 400 and q = 500 the corresponding initial 
values would be 9 and 7, whereas the final ones would be 28 and 22, respectively. These 
figures fit reasonably well with international standards, which sets the number of trains used 
for lines in the range of 300-500 km (although with intermediate stops and shorter legs) 
between 30 and 80 (around 10-15 trains per 100 km of HSR line). 
 
Figure 2.3. Number of trains needed under alternative capacity assumptions 
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In practice, actual rolling stock provision in HSR lines around the world is directly affected 
by several project-specific parameters such as the average commercial speed or the specific  
technology used in each case. Other elements, such as the seasonality of demand or the 
existence of peak periods have been ruled out from this exercise.  
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Figure 2.4. Number of trains needed under alternative speed assumptions 
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With respect to the first one, total travel time is reduced when average commercial speed is 
increased and vice versa, thus affecting the supply calculations. Figure 2.4 illustrates these 
effects by recalculating the number of trains needed under different speed assumptions. 
Obviously, the figures in the reference case (250 km/h) are the same than those in Figure 2.3 
with q = 330. However, note that if speed is reduced to an average of 200 kms/h (not an 
unrealistic assumption, nowadays) the number of trains need at t=40 would jump to 41; on the 
other hand, increasing the speed to 300 kms/h would imply that 28 trains (only five less than 
in the reference case) would be needed.   
 
Figure 2.5. Number of trains needed under alternative initial annual demand 
assumptions 
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Finally, Figure 2.5 proves the strong dependence of the supply calculations with respect to the 
demand projections. It shows the number of trains needed every year under alternative values 
for initial annual demand (as in Table 2.1, above). Note, for example, that departing from 2.5 
million passengers per year, we will only need 6 trains in the first year (and 17 at t=40). But if 
the initial demand were 20 million, then the figures would be 42 and 142. Therefore, a wrong 
demand projection could be more relevant for supply calculations than changes in train 
capacity or in average speed. 
 
2.4. Methodology of cost calculations 
2.4.1. Objectives 
The main objective of this paper is to provide an estimate of the total cost of building, 
operating and maintaining a HSR with technical characteristics and the supply and demand 
conditions described in the previous section. In order to provide a quick reference of our 
reference case, Table 2.2 summarizes the main parameter values considered in our analysis. 
 
Table 2.2. The reference case: main parameter values 
Line length (L) = 500 kms Train capacity ( q ) =330 seats 
Project timeline: t= 0 to t= 40 (T) Load factor (l) = 75% 
Construction period (Tc) = 5 years Operating hours (daily) = 18 hours  
Operation period (T−Tc) = 35 years  Average commercial speed (s) = 250 kms/h 
Initial annual demand (Q5) = 5 mill. passengers Boarding time (between services) =15 minutes 
Growth rate 1 (g1) = 5% (from t=6 to 11) Train contingency factor = 50% 
Growth rate 2 (g2) = 3% (from t=12 to 40)  
 
Although all these values can be individually modified upwards or downwards – ceteris 
paribus – to illustrate their particular effect on our costs results, we will restrict our 
comparative statics exercises only to changes in the initial demand, the train capacity, the 
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commercial speed and the line length, since these four factors summarize the most salient 
economic characteristics of any HSR line. 
As described at Section 2.1, cost calculations will be categorized into two main groups: 
infrastructure costs and rolling stock costs, respectively denoted as IC and RSC. Thus, 
formally, the total cost (TC) of our HSR project (evaluated at t=0) is just given by the net 
present value: 
 
1 (1 )
T
t t
t
t
IC RSCTC
i=
+
=
+∑ . (2.1) 
We now describe the components of each of these costs and how each of them has been 
calculated in our particular example. 
 
2.4.2. Infrastructure costs 
Infrastructure costs (IC) can be divided into construction costs (ICC) and maintenance costs 
(ICM). Both of them are relatively independent on the volume of the traffic and instead can be 
calculated as dependent of the line length (L), just multiplying the number of kilometres by an 
average unit cost (denoted as c and m, respectively). Construction costs spread out over the 
construction period, whereas the maintenance takes place during the operating period (see 
Figure 2.1). Formally, the infrastructure costs can be denoted as 
 
1 1
( )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
o
o
T T
C M
t t t t t
t t T
c L m LIC IC IC
i i= = +
⋅ + ρ ⋅
= + = +
+ +∑ ∑ , (2.2) 
where we have additionally assumed that construction costs also include a surcharge (ρ = 
10%) to take into account planning costs.  
The actual values of the average costs per km (c, m) have been estimated from the values 
found in Chapter 4 database of actual HSR projects. In particular, to err on the side of 
precaution, we did not considered just one value, but three: the lowest unit cost in the 
database (named, the best scenario), the highest unit cost in the database (the worst scenario) 
and the average value in the database (medium scenario).14
                                                 
14 Note that is equivalent to implicitly assume a probability distribution where the three cases are equally likely.   
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Table 2.3. Infrastructure costs per year (reference case) 
 Construction Maintenance 
Period t= 1 to t= 5 t= 6 to t= 40 
Line length (kms) 500 500 
Unit value (€ per km)   
Best scenario 9,000,000 12,919 
Medium scenario 18,000,000 35,624 
Worst scenario 39,000,000 71,650 
Planning cost (%) 10% -- 
Total value (€ per year)   
Best scenario 990,000,000 6,459,500 
Medium scenario 1,980,000,000 17,812,000 
Worst scenario 4,290,000,000 35,825,000 
 
Table 2.3 summarizes the results from these calculations for the reference case (where the line 
length is 500 kms). The lowest construction (maintenance) cost per km is 9 million euros 
(12,919 euros, respectively), whereas the highest is 39 million and 71,650, respectively. Note 
in Table 2.4 that total infrastructure costs are fixed costs that evolve linearly with the length of 
the corridor: for the largest case (650 kms) construction costs might reach a peak of €5,517 
million per year in the worst scenario. 
Table 2.4. Annual infrastructure costs under different line lengths (in €) 
 
 
A final element to take into account in the previous calculations is the residual value of the 
infrastructure at t = 40. This amount – once discounted to t = 0 – reduces the total cost of the 
infrastructure. In general, since there are different assets (tracks, buildings, etc.), with 
different useful lives and depreciation rates, it is quite difficult to provide an accurate value of 
 
L= 250 kms L= 500 kms L= 650 kms 
Building Maintenance Building Maintenance Building Maintenance 
Best 
scenario 495,000,000 3,229,750 990,000,000 6,459,500 1,287,000,000 8,397,350 
Medium 
scenario 990,000,000 8,906,000 1,980,000,000 17,812,000 2,574,000,000 23,155,660 
Worst 
scenario 2,145,000,000 17,912,500 4,290,000,000 35,825,000 5,577,000,000 46,572,500 
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this residual value. To simplify calculations we will just assume that it will be equal to 30% of 
the total construction cost for each particular scenario. Thus, for the reference case in the best 
scenario, with a total building costs of €990 x 5 years = €4,950 million, the residual value at t 
= 40 is €1,485 million. The corresponding residual values for the medium and worst scenarios 
would be €2,700 and €5,850 million, respectively. 
2.4.3. Rolling stock costs 
Rolling stock costs (RSC) are divided into three categories: acquisition (RSCA), operation 
(RSCO) and maintenance (RSCM) of the trains needed to run the services. With respect to the 
acquisition costs they are simply calculated by multiplying the number of trains bought every 
year (RSt – RSt-1) by the unit cost per seat (a) and their average capacity ( q ), so that their 
NPV would be 
 1
1
( )
(1 )
T
A t t
t
t
RS RS a qRSC
i
−
=
− ⋅ ⋅
=
+∑  (2.3) 
 
In practice, the process of contracting, designing, building, delivering and testing new rolling 
stock usually lasts several years; in our example, we will make the assumption that —since 
demand projections are known well in advance— rolling stock is delivered just-in-time. This 
implies, for example, according to our supply calculations, that in 11 trains start operations at 
t = 5 in the reference case. At t = 6, since RS6 = 11, no new train is bought; however, at t = 7 
and additional unit is acquired (since RS7 = 12), and so on. 
Another simplifying assumption is related to the useful life of the rolling stock. We will 
consider that, under adequate maintenance, each trainset is economically usable for at least 40 
years (which corresponds with the average useful life in the industry nowadays). For this 
reason, no technical renewals or replacements are needed and all the new acquisitions are 
related to the growth in demand.  
With respect to the effective cost calculations, the database in the companion Chapter4 
provides three alternative acquisition unit costs in terms of euros per seat, which again we 
label as best scenario (lowest value = 30,000€ per seat), medium scenario (average value = 
50,000€ per seat), and worst scenario (highest value = 65,000€ per seat). Figure 2.6 
summarizes the evolution of total acquisition costs from t=0 to t=40 for the reference case 
(330 seats per train) under the three alternative scenarios. 
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Figure 2.6. Acquisition costs per year under alternative scenarios (in € million) 
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Obviously, the peak at t=5 corresponds to the initial acquisition of rolling stock to start 
operations; afterwards, there are minor periodical acquisitions. This pattern is mimicked in 
Figure 2.7, where we intended to test the potential existence of cost economies associated to 
train size. When the capacity of the trains increase so does their acquisition cost, but fewer 
trains are needed. Although the periodicity of the renewals can be changed (for example, a 
new train is added every three years instead of every two years), these two opposing effect 
tend to cancel each other, thus reducing the possibility of economies of vehicle size.15
                                                 
15 Wei and Hansen (2005) discuss this idea for the case of aircrafts. Their results also suggest that there are no 
large cost reductions associated to larger vehicle sizes.  
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Figure 2.7. Acquisition costs per year under alternative train capacities (in € million) 
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Note that in the previous figures we have just considered the gross acquisition cost. If we 
assume that the average useful life of each rolling stock unit is 40 years and that its value is 
reduced 1/40 every year (linear depreciation), at t = 40 there will be some residual values that 
—once discounted to t = 0— should be reduced from the acquisition costs. These residual 
values depend on the year each particular unit is bought. For example, in the reference case, 
the residual value at t = 40 of the 11 trainset units acquired at t =5 will be 5/40 of their 
acquisition cost; the additional unit bought at t =7 will be worth 7/40 of its initial cost, and so 
on.16
 
 By adding the residual values of all the units bought from t =5 to t =40 we finally get the 
total residual values (at t = 40) of the rolling stock under each possible scenario: in the best 
one, it would be €149,242,500; in the medium scenario, €248,737,500, and in the worst 
scenario €323,358,750.    
On the other hand, the operation and maintenance costs of the rolling stock are heavily 
dependent on the volume of traffic along the line which, indirectly, can be measured through 
the number of trains. In the case of the operation costs (RSO), its main determinants are labour 
and energy. The number of technical crew members per train depends on its technical 
specifications and is usually set in transport regulations. On the contrary, there are no 
                                                 
16 Note for example, that a rolling stock unit bought at t = 40 has a residual value of 40/40 (that is, 100%). 
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minimum standards on cabin attendants and auxiliary personnel, and their number depends on 
the level of service offered to passengers. Energy consumption is calculated in accordance to 
the technical specification of the rolling stock.  
For these reasons, in our simulation exercise we have used the expression: 
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r RS qRSC
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=
+∑ , (2.4) 
where ro is the annual unit operation cost per seat (and q  the average train capacity). Once 
more, the actual value of ro is obtained from the database in Chapter 4, which provides us 
with three alternative estimates: best, medium and worst scenario. The evolution of total 
operation costs from t=0 to t=40 for the reference case is given in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8. Operation costs per year under alternative scenarios (in € million) 
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Figure 2.9. Operation costs per year under alternative train capacities (in € million) 
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Interestingly, when the train size is increased (up to 400 and 500 seats), there are no clear cost 
advantages, as illustrated in Figure 2.9 (drawn for the medium scenario, only). In some years 
it is cheaper to operate larger sized trains, whereas in other years they are too expensive. It is 
important to recall here our simplifying assumption that all trains are equal in size, which is 
somehow unrealistic. 
Finally, the maintenance costs of the rolling stock are not only related to traffic (measured 
through the number of trains) but also to train intensity usage. Thus, a better estimate of the 
NPV of this cost would be given by 
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where rm is the unit maintenance cost per train and kilometre, and Dt is the average distance 
travelled by each train.17
                                                 
17 This average distance has been calculated dividing the total distance covered by all trains every year (number 
of total annual services multiplied by line length) between the number of trains. 
 According to Campos et al. (2007), rm can be estimated around 
2€/km for trains running around 0.5 million kilometres per year. For Chapter 4, our reference 
case, this value yields a total maintenance cost of 20,202,020 euros at t = 5 and 63,798,448 
euros at t = 40. Note that, as depicted in Figure 2.10, larger-size trains are cheaper to 
maintain, since the average distance they travel is lower. 
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Figure 2.10. Maintenance costs per year under alternative train capacities (in € 
million) 
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2.5. Conclusions 
By collecting together all the formulae and calculations in the previous sections, our estimate 
of the total cost (at t=0) of building, operating and maintaining a HSR line would be obtained 
from expression (2.1): 
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Although it jus provides a lower bound to the actual cost, this expression summarizes the 
critical factors that must be taken into account when analyzing the costs of HSR lines. These 
include the line length (L), the number of trains needed to respond to the demand (RS), train 
capacity ( q ), average distance (D) and the corresponding unit costs (c, m, a, ro, rm).  
Table 2.5 summarizes the numerical estimates of this total cost considering a discount rate (i) 
of 5% under alternative assumptions on initial demand, train capacity, commercial speed and 
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line length. We also considered three scenarios regarding the unit costs obtained from the 
database in Chapter 4: the ‘All the best’ scenario always uses the lowest value of the unit 
costs in each case; the ‘All the medium’ scenario always uses the average value of the unit 
costs in each case; the ‘All the worst’ scenario always uses the highest value of the unit costs 
in each case. The implicit assumption behind these compound-scenarios is that there exist a 
perfect positive correlation between all the unit costs: if a country has a large construction 
cost, then its operating cost will be also large, and vice versa. In practice, this is not always 
the case, since in several projects it is observed that the correlation could be even negative. 
 
Table 2.5. Total costs (at t=0) of a HSR line under alternative assumptions (in euros) 
 All the best 
scenario 
All the medium 
Scenario 
All the worst 
scenario 
 Initial demand assumptions    
2,500,000 pass. 6,000,067,777 10,785,250,118 21,065,618,421 
5,000,000 pass. 7,730,285,037 13,029,676,448 23,777,416,675 
10,000,000 pass. 11,187,484,570 17,513,729,139 29,194,942,065 
20,000,000 pass. 18,108,860,949 26,491,173,260 40,041,479,687 
 Train capacity assumptions    
330 seats 7,730,285,037 13,029,676,448 23,777,416675 
400 seats 7,648,681,646 12,945,753,435 23,691,415,005 
500 seats 7,626,652,900 12,940,793,841 23,701,794,353 
 Commercial speed assumptions    
200 kms/h 8,390,219,242 13,913,020,245 24,863,968,621 
250 kms/h 7,730,285,037 13,029,676,448 23,777,416,675 
300 kms/h 7,277,305,302 12,423,499,186 23,031,845,523 
 Line length assumptions    
250 kms 4,080,508,403 6,803,021,727 12,243,154,507 
500 kms 7,730,285,037 13,029,676,448 23,777,416,675 
650 kms 9,909,604,536 16,751,534,490 30,680,581,170 
Note: Results in bold correspond to the reference case. 
According to Table 2.5, the total cost of a 40-year HSR project lies between €7.7 and €23.7 
billion in the reference case, depending on the scenario (best and worse, respectively). On 
average the NPV is 13.0 billion, which implies an average estimate of  €25-30 million per 
kilometre. 
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Table 2.5 also shows that when the initial demand is halved with respect to the reference case 
(that is, only 2.5 million passengers per year), the total cost is reduced (on average) just a 
20%, but if demand is duplicated (10 million passengers) total cost can increase up to 31%. 
Similarly, it is interesting to note that neither the increase in train capacity nor the commercial 
speed have a large impact reducing the total costs of the project. Their effects on the supply 
tend to cancel out. On the contrary, changes in the length of the line are critical: shorter 
(larger) lines are dramatically cheaper (more expensive) to build and operate when compared 
to the reference case.   
This final result is explained by the fact that most of the costs of the projects are fixed. This is 
confirmed in Figures 2.11 to 2.14, where the NPV cost distribution between fixed and 
variable cost (under different assumptions) is displayed.  
 
Figure 2.11. NPV cost distribution depending on initial demand 
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Figure 2.12. NPV cost distribution depending on commercial speed 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13. NPV cost distribution depending on train capacity 
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Figure 2.14. NPV cost distribution depending on line length 
 
 
